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THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF CLOSE
CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENT
GEOFFREY P. MILLER*
Ian Ayres' excellent paper, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of
Statutes,1 identifies an interesting tension in the law and economics of
corporate law by contrasting the views of Judge Richard Posner and his
disciples, who see the common law process as being efficient,2 with those
of Judge Easterbrook, Judge Winter, and their followers, who see legisla-
tion-at least, state corporate legislation-as being a "race to the top"-
i.e., efficient.3 Ayres extends somewhat the trajectory of the Winter-
Easterbrook view because their main concern has been to contrast state
statutes with federal regulation, not with state common law. Winter and
Easterbrook do not claim that state corporate law is necessarily efficient
in any absolute sense, only that it is more efficient than the probable
alternative of federal statutory regulation. But Ayres' characterization
seems at least a plausible extension of the Winter-Easterbrook approach.
Subject to this caveat, I will refer to Ayres' characterization as the "Win-
ter-Easterbrook" view.
Ayres observes that we have one Pangloss too many here. We have
two theories, each of them saying that "everything is for the best in the
best of all possible worlds"-yet the theories are mutually inconsistent:
one focuses on legislation, the other on adjudication. What happens
when legislation and adjudication yield different outcomes-when a
court essentially nullifies a statute through interpretation, or when a leg-
islature enacts a statute overruling a judicial decision? If they are incon-
sistent, how can both be efficient? Ayres poses this question in such a
provocative fashion that he revitalizes a long-standing debate in corpo-
rate law.
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1. Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365 (1992).
2. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). For
other work on the efficiency of the common law, see, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selec-
tion of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977).
3. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26
J. L. & ECON. 23 (1983).
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Another strength of Ayres' article is its focus on close corporations.
Ayres is right that the great debate over the efficiency of corporate law
has been played out largely with the large, public corporation in mind.
Not nearly as much attention has been given to the problem of close
corporations-despite the outstanding work of O'Neal and Thompson,
which, as Ayres rightly observes, is the starting point in any analysis of
this area.4
As Ayres convincingly shows,' the dynamics of the close corporation
area are quite different from the case of large, publicly traded firms. Fol-
lowing Thompson and O'Neal, Ayres observes that the costs of incorpo-
rating in other jurisdictions are almost always prohibitive for close
corporations. Such corporations stay in the state where they have their
principal operations. This means, as Ayres points out, that there is es-
sentially no market for charters of close corporations. Even if a market
could exist, the revenues a state could earn in franchise fees by bidding
for close corporation charters would be minimal. Hence there is a signifi-
cantly different political dynamic in the close corporation area. Ayres
deserves credit for illustrating this feature and exploring some of its
consequences.
In these comments, I focus on two specific aspects of Ayres' paper: his
treatment of the historical evolution of the law of shareholders' agree-
ments in the close corporation context, and his general theory of the effi-
ciency characteristics of the law of close corporations.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS
The principal case study that Ayres uses to explore the political dy-
namics of close corporation law concerns the traditional requirement of
corporate law that managers, not shareholders, have the power and re-
sponsibility to manage a corporation's affairs. Ayres points to a quite
remarkable shift in close corporation law, the evolution from what Ayres
terms a principle of "immutable separation," under which shareholder
agreements that intrude on management functions will be struck down as
inconsistent with state corporation codes, to the modem rule, which Ay-
4. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed.
1987). The leading article on close corporations from a law-and-economics perspective is Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fisehel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271
(1986).
5. Ayres, supra note 1.
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res characterizes as a regime of "nullification." 6 Under this modem re-
gime, courts are much more willing to give effect to shareholders'
agreements in close corporations even when the effect of the agreements
gives shareholders a role in management in apparent disregard of the
statutory injunction that managers manage and shareholders do not.7
The theory Ayres proposes is somewhat subtle, but its main outlines
appear to be four propositions:
1. Because of the lack of competition for close corporation charters,
legislatures have less incentive to adopt efficient provisions for close cor-
porations in the first place, or subsequently to correct errors in original
legislation, than they do in the case of large, publicly held corporations
for which the chartering market is active and vigorous.
2. In the absence of legislative leadership, courts have played an ac-
tive role in close corporation law, especially in the issue of shareholder
agreements, in which the early cases tended to nullify legislative restric-
tions on shareholder management in the close corporation context.
Stop here, and it sounds as if Ayres is in the Posner camp-legislatures
adopted bad rules for close corporations and the courts nullified them,
substituting better rules in their stead. In other words, the common law
is efficient, the legislative process is not.
But Ayres does not stop here, because he traces the history out two
more steps:
3. After an initial period of judicial nullification, many states adopted
special statutory rules for close corporations that legislatively approved
the common law developments and allowed greater shareholder manage-
ment through shareholders' agreements.
4. But now at least one court again nullifies a general corporation
code, this time by enforcing a shareholders' agreement, even though the
corporation in question has failed to avail itself of the special rules avail-
able under the close corporation law.'
Stop here, and Ayres sounds more like Easterbrook and Winter than
Posner. The legislature adopts an efficiency-enhancing rule-the special
shareholders' agreement provisions of close corporation statutes-and
6. Id. at 378-88.
7. Id.
8. Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980). Ayres criticizes this decision with the argu-
ment that, regardless of its efficiency as applied to the particular close corporation at issue in the
case, it undermines the stock of precedents under Delaware law that apply to large, public firms.
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
402 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
here the court mucks everything up. Legislation is efficient, the common
law inefficient.
While Ayres' observations on these developments are astute, I find
them somewhat unsatisfactory because they are not supported by a de-
veloped theory for the dynamic tensions that drive legal history. With-
out such a theory, we are left in the position of seeing the common law as
efficient in some cases, legislation as efficient in others, without any per-
suasive criterion for explaining the oscillation.
It is possible to conjecture why the immutable rule of separation might
have given way to a more flexible rule that allows shareholders a role in
the management of close corporations as agreed by contract, without
positing an oscillation between efficient adjudication and efficient
legislation.9
The early state corporate codes were not enacted to govern small busi-
nesses, but rather to control the activities of emerging larger firms in the
rapidly industrializing years of the late nineteenth century. Most small
businesses that today would be incorporated were not incorporated at the
end of the century, but instead operated as sole proprietorships or part-
nerships. Larger corporations were not characterized by the wide disper-
sal of share ownership that is typical of mature industrial firms today.
Instead, insiders-promoters, managers, or other large shareholders- - '
usually held large blocks of stocks. The "public" shareholders were rela-
tively powerless in the face of these powerful blocks. Accordingly, there
was a serious danger that the holders of the majority or control block
would abuse the minority shareholders.
The early corporation codes responded to this danger by stressing the
role of the board of directors, backed by the legal sanction of fiduciary
duties. The board of directors was to represent the interests of all share-
holders, not just the majority or control block; if it did not do so, it was
potentially subject to sanction for breach of duty. Although the board
might well be responsive to the interests of the control block, the separate
function of the board and its stringent fiduciary duty of loyalty provided
some assurance that minority shareholders would be protected.
It is, I believe, this stress on the role of the board of directors as the
bulwark against oppression of minority shareholders that explains the
"immutable" rule of separation of ownership and control under the early
9. Whether this conjecture holds in fact would require a detailed historical investigation that I
have not attempted for purposes of this Comment.
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corporation codes. If the controlling shareholders could insert them-
selves into a management role, the danger of minority abuse-at least
according to the theory of the early state corporate codes-would in-
crease to unacceptable levels. Hence the immutable rule.
Of course, the "immutable" rule of separation of ownership and con-
trol proved anything but immutable, as courts and later legislatures be-
gan to dismantle its hard-and-fast prohibitions. The reason for the
development, I believe, may well be found in changed circumstances in
the underlying legal and market environments, circumstances that made
the immutable rule inappropriate both for very large corporations and
for very small corporations.
In the case of very large corporations, the rule that managers should
enjoy exclusive management powers came to be seen as relatively unim-
portant. As industrial corporations expanded during the early decades of
the twentieth century, large shareholder blocks became increasingly un-
common. By 1932, Berle and Means had crystallized the concept of
large industrial corporations' new ownership structure with the thesis of
separation of ownership and control.10 They observed that as a practical
matter, ownership and control had been radically separated in the large
industrial corporation. The widespread dispersal of share ownership
largely freed managers from accountability to the ostensible owners of
the corporation.
The immutable rule of separation of ownership and control made little
sense for the Berle and Means corporation. First, it was unnecessary, as
a practical matter, to mandate the separation of ownership and control,
since the separation was there in any event. The danger of majority
shareholders' oppressing minority shareholders was increasingly attenu-
ated as majority or controlling shareholder blocks became less and less
common in the case of large industrial corporations. The legal rule of
immutable separation, accordingly, became largely superfluous as a
means of protecting minority shareholders against majority oppression.
Equally significant, the premise of the immutable rule-that the board
could serve as a useful bulwark against oppression of minority sharehold-
ers by majority investors-became problematic under the Berle and
Means model. In the Berle and Means corporation, the main problem
came to be seen not as majority shareholder oppression of minority
10, ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
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shareholders but managerial abuse of shareholders generally. To this ex-
tent, the value of letting managers manage came to be seen as more
troubling. In the case of large firms, which had been the principal users
of state corporation statutes, the danger came to be seen, not as one of
improperly denying managers the power to manage, but rather one of
improperly giving managers too much power to manage. This under-
mined part of the foundations of what Ayres calls the rule of "immutable
separation."
At about the same time as share ownership was becoming widely dis-
persed among the public in the case of the largest corporations, a new
class of business enterprise-very small firms, or firms with only a very
small number of shareholders-began to make increasing use of the cor-
porate form. It turned out that the immutable rule of separation of own-
ership and control made even less sense for these very small corporations
than it did for the very large ones. In the case of very small corporations,
the small number of shareholders greatly reduced the transactions costs
of obtaining shareholders' agreements that permitted management by
means other than the board of directors. The rule that only managers
could manage impeded the very small firms in their flexibility of opera-
tions. At the same time, if everyone involved in a corporation could
agree that a shareholder agreement be given efficacy, it was hard to see
the harm in enforcing such a rule.
Cases such as Clark v. Dodge 11 can be explained on this ground. The
corporations involved in that case were small (each had only two share-
holders).12 The shareholders' agreement was freely assented to by both
parties, and was supported by a good business purpose. 13 Moreover, the
agreement in question was one that protected, rather than oppressed, the
minority shareholder: the minority shareholder received assurances that
he would be allowed to continue as a director and general manager of
one of the corporations, that he would receive one-fourth of the net in-
come either by way of salary or dividends, and that unreasonable salaries
would not be paid to other officers or agents so as to unfairly reduce the
11. 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936).
12. Id. at 641-42.
13. Clark, the minority shareholder, was in sole possession of trade secrets essential to the
operation of the corporations and did not want to divulge the secrets to the majority shareholder
without assurance that his management and ownership interests would be protected; Dodge, the
other shareholder, wanted to ensure that his son would be able to continue the business after the
death of Clark. Id.
[Vol. 70:399
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/7
EFFICIENCY OF CLOSE CORPORATION LAW
minority shareholder's share.14 Accordingly, the rationale of protecting
minority shareholders was not present here.
The same is true of Zion v. Kurtz,I5 a case strongly criticized in Ayres'
article. The New York Court of Appeals enforced an agreement giving
the minority shareholder of a Delaware corporation veto power over the
conduct of corporate business. Here again, as in Clark, the agreement
enjoyed the unanimous assent of all the shareholders. 6 And, again as in
Clark, the purpose and effect of the agreement was to protect the minor-
ity shareholder against oppression by the majority. Thus the goal of mi-
nority shareholder protection was again not present. The rationale for
applying an immutable rule of separation of ownership and control
hardly seems compelling in such a case.
Thus, the immutable rule of separation of ownership and control
came, over time, to make little sense both in the case of very large corpo-
rations, in which ownership and control was separated in any event and
in which the problem of management abuse suggested caution about
vesting too much confidence in the board of directors as the safeguard of
shareholder interests, and in the case of very small corporations, or cor-
porations with only a very small number of shareholders, in which low
transactions costs permitted the negotiation of value-enhancing arrange-
ments that enjoyed the assent of all shareholders ex ante. The immutable
rule, however, continues to fulfill a valuable function in the case of me-
dium-sized corporations in which large ownership blocks continue to
present a threat of minority oppression. Not surprisingly, the rule does
not appear to have broken down in this context.
II. EFFICIENCY OF CLOSE CORPORATION LAW
It may already be evident that I tend to be more optimistic than is
Ayres about the efficiency implications of this history. To be sure, Ayres
does not see the history as all bad by any means. He is, however, critical
of parts, such as legislatures' initial adoption of broad immutable rules
that did not take account of the special needs of close corporations, and
the more recent phenomenon of the Zion decision that Ayres believes
goes too far in the direction of abandoning the immutable rule against
14. Id. at 642.
15. 405 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980).
16. Id. at 682.
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shareholder management in an area in which the legislature has recently
spoken.
Ayres' model implicitly sets up a four-cell matrix for judging the effi-
ciency of legal principles in the close corporation context:
TABLE 1: EFFICIENCY MATRIX FOR CLOSE CORPORATION LAW
Statute Efficient Statute Inefficient
Common Law Efficient I II
Common Law Inefficient IV III
Ayres' view, I believe, is that the Posner school falls essentially in Cell
II: the common law is efficient; statutory law is inefficient. Easterbrook
and Winter, in this scheme, fall in Cell IV: the common law is inefficient;
statutory law is efficient. In Cell III is William Cary and the traditional
"race-to-the-bottom" theory, which sees both the statute law and the
common law of states such as Delaware, which compete in the corporate
chartering market, as reflecting a competition in laxity in which the in-
terests of shareholders are sacrificed in order to serve those of corporate
managers. 17 Ayres' own view seems to be that, over time, the situation
has fluctuated between Cells II and IV: sometimes, as in Clark v. Dodge,
the common law is efficient and the statute is inefficient; other times, as in
Zion, the statute is efficient, or at least entitled to a presumption of effi-
ciency, and the common law is inefficient.
My own view is that the case of close corporations falls mostly in Cell
I: both the common law and statutes are efficient. Ayres' article suggests
that, at least in the area of shareholders' agreements, Cell I should be
empty since the statute and the common law are in conflict and both
cannot be efficient at the same time. Ayres, however, fails to show any
real conflict between statute and common law in this area. Even when
the common-law judges nullified statutes, there was no real conflict be-
cause, as Ayres himself acknowledges, this was a judicial response to
changed circumstances."8 Far from resenting the judicial intermeddling,
the legislatures subsequently revised the laws to codify the common-law
changes.9 The Zion case, which Ayres views as essentially in conflict
17. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974).
18. Ayres cites Dean Guido Calabresi's influential book, A Common Lawfor the Age of Statutes
(1982), which encourages judges to update statutes that have become obsolete.
19. See Ayres, supra note 1.
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with recent legislation, was arguably not so because, as I have noted,2°
the shareholder agreement in that case protected, not harmed, the minor-
ity shareholder interests that are served by the rule that only managers
can manage. There was no real conflict here with the purpose of the
statute. The corporation's failure to avail itself of the special protections
of the close corporation statute can be easily characterized as a technical
flaw that can be judicially corrected, without undermining the purposes
of the statute, when doing so enforces the ex ante agreement of the par-
ties and prevents opportunistic and oppressive behavior by the majority
shareholder. Thus there is little convincing evidence in the historical rec-
ord that judges and legislatures have operated at cross purposes in this
area.
There are good reasons to conclude, at least as a matter of theory, that
both statutes and the common law should be relatively efficient in the
close corporation context. Jonathan Macey and I have addressed this
general topic in earlier work,2" following the seminal contributions of
Roberta Romano. 22 With respect to large, publicly traded business cor-
porations, the picture appears to sort between Cells I and III depending
on the nature of the issue. When agency costs are not an issue and exter-
nalities are not present, the Delaware Corporation Code and, its body of
judicial interpretation seems to fall in Cell I-both are efficient. When,
however, agency costs are high and capable of being imposed on persons
residing out of state, Cell III is more likely to describe the situation for
the large, public corporation: both the common law and the statute law
are inefficient. The locus classicus for this situation is the hostile take-
over, in which both Delaware statutory and judge-made law appear effi-
ciency reducing.2"
Although theory predicts that both statutory and judge-made law are
likely to be inefficient in some cases as applied to large, publicly traded
firms, the same is not true for close corporations. In the case of close
corporations, unlike large public corporations, externalities are few and
agency costs are low. All parties to the close corporation usually live and
20. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
21. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Dela-
ware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REv. 469 (1987).
22. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
23. See Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in BROOKINGS INSTITUTION DIscuSSION PAPER IN
ECONOMICS NO. 91-4 (1991); Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and
Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 457 (1988).
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vote in the state of incorporation, so the opportunity to impose costs
selectively on out-of-state interests is not present.24 None of the interests
associated with a close corporation has a systematic incentive to seek
inefficient rules, either by way of legislative lobbying or by way of litiga-
tion. In particular, there is no distinct class of "managers" of close cor-
porations who want to exploit shareholders, since the managers typically
are the shareholders.25
The upshot of all this is that the political economy of close corporation
statutes should tend towards efficient outcomes, whether generated by
judges or by legislatures. The process should establish good rules over
time, not because the rulemakers are particularly brilliant or altruistic,
but simply because it is in nearly everyone's interests that good rules be
adopted. Indeed, this appears to be what we observe in the close corpo-
ration case, at least with respect to the rules respecting shareholder
agreements that Ayres discusses in this excellent and extraordinarily in-
teresting article.
24. This may be one reason why franchise fees for close corporations appear to be so low. See
Ayres, supra note 1. Close corporations often have political clout in the state of their incorporation
because everyone associated with a close corporation tends to be from the state. One would expect
fees to be higher for larger corporations because the costs can be imposed on out-of-state
shareholders.
25. Ayres suggests towards the end of his article that majority shareholders form a political
interest group in the close corporation, and that this group has a systematic interest in oppressing
minority interests. Id. But the evidence Ayres cites for this proposition is impressionistic at best.
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